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Abstract
Nietzsche is one of the most controversial and disputed philosophers, espe-
cially because of his association with Hitler and Nazism, but also through his 
upsetting philosophical decisions that deny the possibility of any morality 
centered on good and evil as absolute values in themselves. As for his associ-
ation with Hitler, the sources prove that Nietzsche’s philosophy has nothing 
to do with the justification or support of the nationalist-socialist dictatorship. 
In addition, any connoisseur of his work can easily see that Hitler does not 
fit at all with the description of the overman that Nietzsche conceptualizes 
and identifies with. As for morality, it seems to support a relativization of 
the values of good and evil until their dissolution, but a closer look can see 
that the morality of the masters accredited by Nietzsche is one of austerity, 
balance, respect, honor, dignity, of preferring loneliness to the amusement of 
the crowd. All these are values that even Christianity proposes. Lonely and 
incomprehensible, the master, Nietzsche lives a lifestyle similar to Christian 
ascetics. And just as the philosopher claims that the life of the masters should 
not be passed through the sieve of ordinary moral evaluations, who could 
judge in terms of “good” or “bad” the way the austere ones lived?
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Introduction
Overman Nietzsche with deep intuitions and psychological inclina-tions argues that everything we think, do, the values we adhere to, 
the philosophy we conceive are nothing but the expression of our inner 
springs, our desires and failures, our defects or qualities. He gives birth to 
a philosophy which is the expression of his own frustrations, sufferings, 
failures, disappointments. Sick and suffering from an illness that seems 
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to be inherited from his father, Nietzsche has had severe migraines since 
childhood. Over time, he develops psychiatric disorders from the registry 
of depression, cognitive decline with dementia and stroke. Despite the 
widespread opinion that syphilis caused his neurological disease, the con-
clusions of some contemporary specialists who studied the case are that 
Nietzsche suffered from cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with 
subcortical infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL).1 Nietzsche is 
aware that he will suffer a stroke and is proud that he led an ascetic life 
during these years, so he no longer needs religion or art, as he confesses in 
a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug in 1880.2
He is so intellectually appreciated that he is appointed professor at the 
University of Basel at only 25 years old. In his private life, however, he expe-
riences failure, being rejected by the woman he loved. Lonely and incom-
prehensible, enduring devastating physical suffering, loss of consciousness, 
paralysis so that he could no longer speak, manifestations of deep mental 
slippage towards the end of life, Nietzsche sees the world in terms of his own 
failures and sufferings, as a hostile one. His cerebral torment is long-term 
and so intense that he comes to think that thinking means suffering, and 
suffering is thinking.3 That is why the only thing that can elevate humanity 
and give meaning to individual life is suffering. Only she is the one who 
can lead to extraordinary transformations and achievements and only small 
people run away from her. Through this statement, Nietzsche is closer to 
the Holy Fathers and Christian ascetics than he would have ever imagined 
and desired. John Chrysostom says that: “... he allowed the right to be ruled 
by suffering, so that you could see that even suffering he remained wise”4, 
and the Bible keeps telling us: “Blessed is the one who perseveres under 
trial because, having stood the test, that person will receive the crown of 
life…” (James 1: 12) and “…the one who stands firm to the end will be 
saved.” (Matthew 10: 22)
Concerned with what he feels and what others think, Nietzsche studies 
people and is so fascinated by his discoveries that he comes to believe that 
psychology should be recognized as the queen of science “…for whose 
service and equipment the other sciences exist.”5 His moral work is, rather 
than a philosophy, a psychological investigation of the man of genius, of 
the superman, of the self, for Nietzsche thinks of himself as a overman. 
1  Dimitri Hemelsoet, Koenraad Hemelsoet, Daniel Devreese, “The neurological illness 
of Friedrich Nietzsche”, in Acta neurologica Belgica (Bruxelles: Acta Medica Belgica, 2008, 
108), 9–16.
2  Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1997), 19.
3  Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 24.
4  Saint John Chrysostom, Comment on Job [in Romanian], trans. Laura Enache (Iași: 
Doxologia, 2012), 50.
5  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Planet PDF, online edition), 40.
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The rest in his writings is art, literature, music. He is well known for his 
musical inclination, he composes lieds, pieces for piano, choir and orches-
tra, he is a very good philologist and connoisseur of great literary works, 
a very competent critic of literary and musical works. When you read his 
writings, in order to penetrate the thinking behind the words, you need a 
terrible effort to get over the countless metaphors, artistic flourishes, jester 
words and acid irony that abound in his philosophical works. In an opera 
such as Thus Spoken Zarathustra we find, like Michael Allen Gillespie said 
in the foreword of the book cited,6 
…is a strenuous experience that requires a multitude of skills as 
well as great endurance. It is a book that contain philosophical 
speculation, poetic flights of fancy, prophetic utterance, wild 
satire, social commentary, and introspective self-examination.
But, above all, behind the mischievous and insulting words, you discover 
a Nietzsche with a soul so limp and large that it is deeply crushed by the 
desire to ensure that the world not only survives but progresses. With a 
terrible sense of history, Nietzsche leaves legacy his unshakable faith in 
man and humanity.
Contents
The morality he proposes, beyond good and evil, is the attempt to over-
come traditional morality, any form of ethics, denying things in themselves 
the fact of being good or bad. It is not the facts that carry value, but the 
people. That is why Nietzsche speaks of a morality of masters and a morality 
of slaves. It challenges ethics to establish rules, principles because they can-
not be applied equally to all people. People are not the same and therefore 
cannot be judged by the same canons. That is why he implicitly challenges 
the democracy that had been established in Europe and that established 
equality between people, that wanted and saw people in a uniform way and 
that, above all, allowed the “crowd” to represent a decision-making force. 
Dissatisfied that elites are no longer a force, at least not a decisional one, he 
concludes that democracy is the one that destroys the chance of the human 
species to evolve, to progress. Those who through their spirit and capacity 
can bring innovation, progress are the intellectual elites, the true aristoc-
racy that can draw humanity to the highest heights as a species. And, if the 
elite does not dictate the course of the world, it does not rule, then people 
have no choice towards evolution. Hence the terrible tirade of slanderous 
and passionate addresses to the democratic system. He accepts diversity, 
6  Stanley Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), vii.
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knows it exists, but does not consent to equal treatment for unequal people. 
Extremist in approaches as a teenager, he completely rejects any form of 
government that would allow such situations and identifies in democracy 
the source of this evil. The guilt, however, does not belong to the individual 
who believes himself equal in all respects with the most spiritualized like 
him, because he cannot understand more being limited by his own igno-
rance. The culprit is the system and his morality that make such a society 
possible. Nietzsche considers slavery, for example, a normal, beneficial 
form because the plebeians, as he calls it, only have to obey in order not to 
be allowed to make harmful mistakes for the elites.
But the citadel ruled by the sages is a much older utopia of Plato, whom 
he sees as an aristocrat corrupted by the mediocre rationality of Socrates. 
He even suspects Plato’s teacher that he is really harming young people, 
attracting the condemnation of the city and death. The accusation he brings 
against Plato is not related to the philosophical state, but to the statue of a 
Supreme Good and an intelligible world, beyond our world, as a kind of 
God. Convinced evolutionist, Nietzsche does not believe in the immortal-
ity of the soul and the existence of another world, nor does he believe in 
the existence of the soul, explicitly mentioning that spirit and aristocratic 
intelligence are inherited from ancestors, therefore genetically. You don’t 
become an aristocrat, you are born one.
His audacity to challenge the existence of good and evil in itself is 
not doubled by the audacity to challenge the existence of good and evil. 
These moral poles have different valences depending on the person who 
commits them. Thus, some are allowed to do whatever they feel, and they 
think they should do, namely masters, and others have the right to do 
only what their masters allow them to do, namely slaves. But the deeds 
of the masters are not good in the utilitarian sense. Not because they 
bring good consequences for others, for themselves, for as many people 
as possible. It is not the consequences that decide what is a good thing, 
but even the inner constitution of the master and the good taste of the one 
who acts. On the other hand, Nietzsche considers good everything that 
is done for the progress and evolution of mankind, and aristocrats work 
towards this. Only they have this orientation. Therefore, to judge with 
the same measure, rule, one and the same deed performed by different 
people, belonging to different castes by their very origin, is considered 
by Nietzsche a nonsense.
He classifies historical epochs according to their relation to morality, as 
proof that he is deeply concerned with understanding what has not worked 
and reconstructing it from the perspective of life: 
It is from the perspective of life that Nietzsche weighs the uses 
and disadvantages of history in the untimely meditation of that 
title, for the sake of life that he revaluates the value of truth 
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itself at the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, and it is from 
this same perspective that Nietzsche determines the worth of 
competing moral systems in On the Genealogy of Morals and 
elsewhere.7 
In prehistoric times, morality judged the value or non-value of an action 
by its consequences. This is in fact the pre-moral age of humanity. In the 
moral age, the value of an action is given by its causes, by its intentions, and 
thus the first step towards self-knowledge was made. Residing in intentions 
is, however, “…a prejudice, perhaps a prematureness or preliminariness…”8 
According to Nietzsche, the period in which he lives, 1844-1900, is on the 
threshold of an ultra-moral era in which “…the decisive value of an action 
lies precisely in that which is not intentional…” 9, in other words, in our 
unconscious contents which determine us and from which we cannot evade. 
Contemporary psychological research on the unconscious seems to seem to 
agree with him in the sense that our deep content determines our actions 
and choices more than we might think.
In this perspective, aristocrats do not intentionally make progress for 
others, but through their very existence they generate it implicitly, uncon-
sciously. In addition, what determines the world in a valuable way is not 
the instinct of conservation, which is only a consequence, a second-hand 
causality specific to slaves, but the instinct of will to power. The causality of 
the will to power is the only reality, it is the world. Classical morality, espe-
cially Christian morality, believes in the moral opposition of values, in the 
existence of good and evil itself as opposite values. But these are inventions 
meant to justify our own smallness and weakness, just words to reassure 
us that we have a clear conscience, says Nietzsche. The reason why people 
in general are compassionate, for example, is not a virtue of the soul, it is 
only the expression of our inclination towards cruelty, an inclination that 
we satisfy by leaning on the suffering, misfortune of another. Simple people, 
slaves, do not make gestures of generosity from the spiritual abundance 
they possess, they do not even understand the meaning of their gesture, 
they just conform to established rules and satisfy their vanity. 
…morality in Europe at present is herding-animal morality… 
dwarfing of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they 
call it, to a man of ‘free society’), this brutalizing of man into a 
pigmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly possible!10
7  Michael Frazer, ”The compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on sympathy and strength,” 
Review of Politics, ed. Ruth M. (Cambridge University Press, 2006, 68, no. 1), 54.
8  Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 55.
9  Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 55.
10  Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 139–144.
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We can understand Nietzsche’s panic at his own conclusions, and we can 
understand why he needed to believe in the possibility of an overman. The 
overman freed from the bondage of the tyranny of good and evil as values 
in themselves, as absolute and opposite values, can save humanity from 
its catastrophic decline. A misunderstood genius, unmatched by anyone 
else around him, Nietzsche was probably deeply marked by the attitudes 
of his contemporaries. And, because a genius accepts nothing below his 
value and condition, he prophesies the hope of an overman.
His fundamental belief is that society must be the foundation that allows 
the elite to rise to its mission, namely a higher existence. We do not have to 
take into account and care for most of them, but for the few, chosen ones, 
who can carry the many in history. The morality of slaves is that of people 
who look with suspicion and envy at the virtues of the powerful, who do 
not know respect. It is one of the utilities in which only those meant to make 
the burden of existence easier through compassion are valued, patience, 
modesty, kindness, solidarity. They allow slaves to benefit, but they also 
allow them to steal the natural strength and health from their masters.11 
Slaves see in the good one easy to fool, so a fool. And they need to fool their 
masters, to get their appreciation. But they forget who they really are, and 
that vanity determines them, that is why they come to believe that they 
really are good. This vanity is an atavism, in Nietzsche’s opinion, it comes 
from ancestral genes, so it cannot be avoided.
By contrast, the aristocratic morality of the masters despises cowards, 
fearfuls, the petty who care only about strict utility, those who humble 
themselves, flatter and lie. Moral qualifications must be applied to people, 
then to deeds. The aristocrat respects the strong man, master of himself, who 
knows how to endure suffering and who is harsh with himself. Proud and 
self-confident, hostile to altruism, the overman knows how to carry his cross, 
detests mercy and vanity that belong only to slaves. The one who knows 
his value does not need confirmations, praises, the tumult of the crowd. 
The overman is lonely because he is different from others, he is isolated, 
and the deep suffering that resides in understanding the world and things 
is what ennobles him. Elites, being chosen and lonely people, are rarely 
perpetuated by their descendants. The loss, the failure of superior people 
in aspects related to everyday pragmatism is a rule because the preoccupa-
tion of the overman is beyond the direct utility specific to many. Just as the 
man who comes out of Plato’s cave and sees the sunlight loses the tests in 
competition with those bound in the cave. Those who did not come to the 
surface are wrong about the shadows on the wall but are more skilled and 
experienced in handling them even if the shadows are a mistake. To explain 
who the aristocrats are, Nietzsche, a philologist, finds the origin of the word 
“noble” connected with Greek εσϑλος (esthlos) used by the Megarian poet 
11  Frazer, “The compassion of Zarathustra,” 65.
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Theognis, and that meant “the one that is exists,” “the real one,” “the one 
who is the truth,” “the one that is truthful,” “the good one.” But the term 
was originally attributed, says Nietzsche, to blond-haired conquerors. If the 
aristocrats are the good ones, it is clear that the plebeians, the slaves are the 
bad ones. In order to etymologically justify this aspect, he says that “malus” 
in Latin, which means evil, was a term attributed, in fact, to the pre-Aryans, 
those with black hair, the aborigines who lived in Italy before the Aryans 
conquerors with blond hair. Hence the association of the noble, good, pure 
with the blond Aryans who conquer, which the Hitlerite later speculates.12 
Nietzsche himself refers to the holiness of aristocrats: 
The highest instinct for purity places him who is affected with 
it in the most extraordinary and dangerous isolation, as a saint: 
for it is just holiness—the highest spiritualization of the instinct 
in question… The pity of the saint is pity for the filth of the 
human, all-too-human.13 
True compassion, behold, belongs to the highest spirits.14 But, the aris-
tocrat does not come to aid the unfortunates because of pity. Mercy is the 
practice of the slave who wants to obtain the appreciation of others. It comes 
from the power that flows from his spirit, from the consciousness of an 
abundance of power that he wants to give himself. Aristocrats are selfish 
because he who aspires to high goals sees in others either means or brakes. 
But they are authentic, they recognize the value when they see it and respect 
it. And, if they manage to reach the top, they can show their kindness to 
others. Until then, he plays a comedy in front of others in order to resist. 
In fact, the origin of the term “good” does not even lie in the altruism of 
the common people, says Nietzsche, they are only those who have been 
shown goodness. The origin of good is in those who felt that they were 
doing well what they were doing and that they were good, namely the 
powerful, the aristocrats, the enlightened minds. The three hundred faces 
which Nietzsche advises the aristocrats to wear for deceive, mimicking 
the virtue of the crowd, are meant to enable them to endure the suffering 
of this world alone. In Christian asceticism, we encounter a similar advice 
addressed to Christian ascetics by Evagrius Ponticus: “Sometimes it is 
necessary to pretend that you do not know, because those who spy on you 
are not able to understand you.”15 But the true virtues to which Nietzsche 
urges them to be part of are: boldness, understanding, affection, loneliness.
12  Friedrich Nietzsche, The genealogy of morals, trans. by Horace B. Samuel (New York: 
Boni and Liveright, 1887), 8–9.
13  Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 280-281.
14  Frazer, ”The compassion of Zarathustra”, 64.




Despite the fact that Nietzsche says about the meaning of the ascetic ideal 
for saints that it is a pretext for hibernation, their peace in nothingness and 
forms of madness, sees in asceticism the great conservative and affirmative 
forces of life. But not in the asceticism of priests, but in that of elites. The 
words that define the ascetic ideal are: poverty, humility, chastity, and phi-
losophy, says Nietzsche, would have been impossible in a world without an 
ascetic cloak. But philosophy, adhering to the ascetic ideal, makes the same 
mistake as religion: it considers the Truth as a kind of God. For Nietzsche, 
the truth is only that kind of error without which the human species could 
not live. The contradiction, however, is not between true and false, but 
between the “abbreviations of signs” (words) and the “signs” themselves.16 
In the world in which Nietzsche lived, as he experienced it every day, 
depression was, in his opinion, a frequent and natural consequence. Which 
seems to be the case today. And the methods derived from the asceticism of 
priests, in the author’s opinion, were intended to diminishing depression, 
unhappiness, and emotional excesses: stoically enduring suffering, guilt, 
hope for a better world and a good reward for good deeds, compassion, 
mutual help, love of the other one, diligence as occupational therapy etc.17 
But, Nietzsche denies that these mechanisms work, believing that instead 
of healing them, they made them even worse. Moreover, these are an illu-
sion, an error, because there is no God and no other world. Therefore, the 
asceticism of priests does not achieve its goal. But neither is it necessary 
because, in Nietzsche’s opinion, elites do not flee from unhappiness and 
suffering, but are perfected by them. Suffering ennobles, does not heal. 
Hence the accusation in slanderous terms brought against Christianity of 
having destroyed for centuries the chance of mankind to evolve, to spiri-
tual exaltation and inventiveness, to have destroyed the health of the soul. 
Christianity has created the illusion that we must feel guilty and must 
heal, when in fact we must accept our unhappiness as our only chance for 
a better, evolving future. True creation is born from suffering, it requires 
sacrifice. As for guilt, the elites have nothing to justify to anyone. They 
know their way is right.
Nietzsche, however, makes an incredible confession in this regard: the 
ascetic ideal was embraced by all, either by religion or by philosophy, 
because it gave meaning to human existence. Everyone’s despair comes 
from the fact that, when questioned, they could not find a purpose in life. 
The ascetic ideal filled this void. That way, each of us could want something, 
no matter what. The will is thus saved. It is better to want nothingness than 
to want nothing. Why is the will so important that Nietzsche accepts the 
16  Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 44.
17  Nietzsche, The genealogy of morals, 94–178.
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ascetic ideal, with all its errors, only because it is the only means by which 
the will is saved? Because the will is fundamental to human existence, and 
the will of power is the supreme value of life. The chosen spirits have a 
great Will of power, and this will is the one that ensures the evolution of 
the human species. He embraces the ascetic ideal only because it protects 
the will and, through it, our chance for progress. We see how the author, 
striving to put aside what he thinks is wrong, but keeping what he considers 
to be correct, concludes that the life of the authentic people, of the aristo-
crats, must be lived with asceticism: with the assumption of own suffering, 
with its acceptance, in poverty because the overman does not care about 
the worldly things, in isolation because the crowd cannot understand you 
and the noise of the crowd disturbs you from high goals. In all his deeply 
psychological explanations and interpretations, it is clear that he relates 
to himself and justifies himself to himself. He, Nietzsche, is an aristocrat, 
a genius misunderstood by many, innocent and innovative, aware of his 
own truth, who does not need to account to the crowd, which accepts and 
values his suffering, depression.
In the context of this discussion, however, it is less important why 
Nietzsche adheres to ascetic values. Through the philosophy he devel-
oped and the way he lived, he gets closer to Christian ascetics more than 
he would have liked. His association with Christian ascetics would have 
been vehemently rejected by the author. But his will does not disturb our 
perception. Even his separation from God when he declares that the God is 
dead is only an effect of his complex philosophy. We, living, experimenting, 
learning, are no longer identical with the one I was yesterday. Likewise, the 
statement that “God is dead” only opens the soul to its multiple identities, 
being only a disposition that refers to a certain moment. Died that identity 
of mine that perceived God in a certain way to make place for another face 
of the multiple identities we can have. The eternal return makes it possible 
for everyone to be anyone from the past.18 Maybe that’s why he identified 
himself with Christ before he died. Although disappointed by people as 
he knew them, Nietzsche loves the human species so much that he seeks, 
through his philosophy, a way to ensure his survival, his progress. Christian 
ascetics nurture the same love but manifest it through prayer. I will make 
a short description of the master, of the one with the Will to Power, of 
Nietzsche’s aristocrat in order to be able to notice who else we can identify 
in these words.
The master is wise, isolated, suffers deeply, does not mix with the peo-
ple, has a supreme goal, has respect, a kind of piety in the face of value 
and self-imposed things, is one who understands, who has feelings and 
affection in the human sense, he knows how to be patient, he has purity 
of soul, spirituality, he does not act utilitarian and in the sense of his own 
18  Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 57.
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advantage, he is harsh in the sense of sober and serious, he is not inclined 
towards fun, knows fear, but vanquishes it, sees the abyss, but with pride, 
with eagle’s eyes, does not leave personal responsibilities on the shoulders 
of others, so he has a sense of responsibility and, through this, courage, but 
not the courage in front of witnesses, but the hermit and eagle courage, is 
strong spiritually because he carries on his shoulders the whole human 
universe, but soft, emotionally fragile, open heart, he knows when to be 
silent and when to speak, is honest, does not expect glory or praise from 
anyone, is modest, does not claim merits, is selfish, but in the sense that he 
only takes into account personal values, he has kindness, has noble, supreme 
goals. We can recognize in this brief description a way of life specific to 
Christian ascetics.
Christian asceticism is the process of purification and enlightenment, 
through the action of divine grace and personal spiritual efforts. Asceticism, 
as a way of life, presupposes austerity and abstinence from whatever is 
worldly. But in the literature, it is pointed out that profane asceticism, 
without the purpose of perfection in God, can lead to self-deification, to 
the pride of the Self, to isolation and depression. Nietzsche lives this phe-
nomenon. In fact, he is an ascetic who has lost his God and, in his absence, 
deifies himself and, through himself, the Man. Asceticism is not, however, a 
practice specific only to Christian monks or philosophers. It was an ideal and 
a practice of life in all the great religions of all times, but also for emperors. 
A telling example from the 4th century is the pagan emperor Julian, a fierce 
persecutor of Christians. About him, Ammianus Marcelinus tells that he 
slept on the ground only spreading a bedding, and sometimes he did not 
sleep at all, he had a strict sexual abstinence regime: 
…he imposed on himself a rigid temperance, and maintained it 
as if he had been living under the obligation of the sumptuary 
laws…Julian now forbade pheasants, or sausages, or even sow’s 
udder to be served up to him, contenting himself with the cheap 
and ordinary food of the common soldiers.19 
Ammianus noted that he followed the example of Alexander, who strove 
not to be weakened by passions, 
…having placed a brazen shell on the ground beneath him, 
used to hold a silver ball in his hand, which he kept stretched 
outside his bed, so that when sleep pervading his whole body 
had relaxed the rigour of his muscles, the rattling of the ball 
falling might banish slumber from his eyes.20 
19  Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History, ed. by Henry G. Bohn, online ed. (London: 
1862), 88–89.
20  Marcellinus, Roman History, 89.
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Evagrius Ponticus says: 
A soul has acquired to be free of passions when it is not tempted 
by passion, not only in the face of things, but remains indifferent 
even in the face of their remembrance… The one who is accom-
plished do not restrains himself and the one without passions 
do not endure because the endure (is needed) to the one who 
have passions and the restraint to the one who is troubled… 
The one who has built up the virtues in himself and is soaked 
in them no longer remembers the law, nor the commandments, 
nor the punishment, but says and acts them all as his perfect 
condition dictates him.21 
In other words, the one who has reached such a spiritual level has no 
law, no constraint or self-constraint, is not accountable and is not punished 
because, internalizing the virtues and the law to such an extent that he 
identifies himself with them, he becomes the law, becomes the virtue. We 
recognize in this way of being the Nietzsche’s master. The virtues of which 
Evagrius speaks are wisdom, temperance, love, restraint, manhood (cour-
age), patience, and, above all, justice. We met them above in the description 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy gives to the overman.
The aspect that kept Nietzsche alive, conscious and intellectually active, 
was his will. In these conditions, how somebody cannot think that the 
source of life is the will? And because the Will to power did not fit into the 
same book with God, Nietzsche chose to be original, innovative. Beyond 
that, however, the man he values and glorifies follows the beaten path of 
asceticism.
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